Checkable rules for AI agents.
Open the browser example →
Source, proofs, and evidence on GitHub ↗
As AI systems become more capable, alignment increasingly concerns the organization of power. An agent that allocates resources, delegates work, or determines what another agent may do is exercising authority. When agents act together, the consequences depend on how their decisions interact and on the rules that give those decisions force.
Institutional design offers a way to think about this problem. Cooperation within a group can coexist with disregard for people outside it. Individually reasonable decisions can produce an unacceptable collective outcome. Rules that work under ordinary conditions can become vulnerable as participants gain the ability to exploit them. Trustworthy autonomy requires ways to justify decisions, examine consequences, resolve competing claims, and preserve the ability to change course.
Legitimacy studies the rules that could make such autonomy possible. It brings together social choice, formal verification, and models of strategic behavior to ask how governance can remain coherent and correctable as capabilities grow toward superintelligence. Lean proofs and executable Rust experiments make parts of that question precise: which guarantees can coexist, what evidence a governing rule must supply, and how useful action can survive the constraints needed for safety.
A policy forbids publishing both fragments of a protected record. Two agents are each allowed to publish their own fragment. Judged separately, both requests pass. Together, their deliveries violate the policy.
The composition experiment makes this failure concrete. A guard remembers what has already become public and blocks the second disclosure, while still allowing delivery to a private vault or publication of a harmless summary. The forbidden outcome stays the same; useful work remains possible.
Explore the seven outcomes in your browser →
No installation. Inspect recorded deliveries, compare the repair, and change selected
evidence to see how the checker responds.
This is a sequential experiment with two supplied identities and synthetic data; it runs no language model. The browser presents captured examples and recomputes finite checks. The separate reproduction guide covers execution, signed receipts, and the Lean proofs of the repair for every finite request sequence in the model. It is not a claim to prevent arbitrary production incidents.
Start with the five-minute evidence map for what is proved, executed, or still open. The formal overview follows the argument to named declarations, and the module map locates the code. The research comparison distinguishes the contribution from prior work.
The six current manuscripts cover the program, kernel, impossibility theorem, stability bounds, structural audits, and related research. The original v1.0.0 paper archive remains readable here; consult the repository for subsequent revisions.
v1.1.1 · public Rust + Lean 4
The signed v1.1.1 release
includes the composition experiment and an offline Linux x86_64 bundle.
Source and verification instructions
are public, with automatic verification on GitHub.
The proof gate checks for zero sorry, admit, or first-party axiom;
the repository states the remaining model, toolchain, and execution assumptions.